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Abstract 
This paper borrows analytical tools from the study of public policy and applies them 
to the explanation of the issues surrounding the development of universities’ “Third 
Mission” indicators. The “Third Mission” refers to all activities concerned with the 
generation, use, application and exploitation of knowledge and other university 
capabilities outside academic environments. Third Mission activities have received 
substantial policy and academic attention and there is a perceived need for new 
indicators to support their management, guide policy action and provide empirical 
evidence for research on their nature and impact. Yet, despite substantial effort, there 
has been little progress towards the generation of clear, internationally comparable 
datasets. Public policy analysis offers us tools to understand these difficulties. We 
analyse the generation and management of “Third Mission” indicators as an example 
of policy implementation. Using the cases of the UK and Spain, we find that this field 
of activity is characterised by a high level of ambiguity in the definition of policy 
goals accompanied by conflict among policy stakeholders. In these cases, policy 
analysts have suggested that policy implementation becomes “symbolic”, and depends 
on the strength of local stakeholder coalitions. We find that the development of Third 
Mission indicators fits this model, and conclude by discussing the policy implications 
of this finding.  
Introduction 
This paper analyses the development of “Third Mission” indicators. We use the term 
“Third Mission” to refer to all activities concerned with the generation, use, 
application and exploitation of knowledge and other university capabilities outside 
academic environments (Molas-Gallart, Salter, Patel et al., 2002). These activities add 
to the traditional “first” and “second” university missions: teaching and academic 
research. Third Mission activities have received substantial policy and academic 
attention (Polt, Rammer, Gassler et al., 2001; European Commission, 2003) . There is 
a perceived need for new indicators to support the management of Third Mission 
activities, guide policy action and support research on their nature and impact. Yet, 
despite the many initiatives, the development of Third Mission indicators has been 
anything but easy. Despite repeated and protracted efforts in several European 
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countries and at EU level to develop a common set of “Third Mission” indicators to 
assess the nature and impact of university activities on their socio-economic 
environment, and to enable longitudinal and cross-country studies, progress has been, 
at best, sluggish. We are confronted with a disorderly clutter of partial indicators 
stemming from questionnaires and data-gathering initiatives developed at 
international, national, or regional level, with varying degrees of robustness and little, 
if any, comparability. Why is this the case?  
The question is relevant both from an academic and from a policy perspective. There 
is a need for robust analysis to support the development of new Third Mission 
policies, while there is understandable academic interest in the impact of business and 
social engagement initiatives on the character of university activity and publicly-
funded research. Yet, data limitations have constrained research to national and 
regional analysis or to international comparisons of narrowly defined sub-sets of 
Third Mission activity. Further, the scope of academic research is often confined to 
those areas where data is available: mainly on commercialisation activities (i.e. where 
universities attempt to generate revenues through the exploitation of their Intellectual 
Property -IP), on which organisations keep accounting records for administrative 
purposes. The problem for those aiming at the systematic use of quantitative 
indicators for the analysis of Third Mission activities is that the areas on which 
information tends to exist are not necessarily the most important, and that the 
importance of different activities varies across disciplines. For instance, available data 
on commercialisation activities is relevant for the analysis of fields like biotechnology 
and information technologies, where important markets exists “close” to university 
research and training, but it is not adequate for disciplines, like philosophy or 
theoretical physics, where the commercial applications are more limited and impact 
occurs through other channels. Further, universities make contributions to government 
and civil society as well as to the private sector, assisting not only with economic 
performance but also helping to improve quality of life and the effectiveness of public 
services. In fact, it is increasingly recognised that focusing Third Mission activities on 
IP commercialisation strategies would likely lead to universities delivering less value 
to society (Florida, 1999). Consequently, any approach to data collection and analysis 
that focuses purely on university commercial activities is likely to miss large and 
important parts of the picture. 
We will analyse the development of Third Mission indicators as part of the broader 
environment in which Third Mission policies are defined and implemented. Seeing 
indicator generation as part of the policy implementation process will help us assess 
the causes behind the slow progress in the definition and production of indicators. The 
first section of the paper applies concepts from the policy implementation literature to 
the issues at hand, and suggests that the generation of Third Mission indicators can be 
seen as a case of “symbolic implementation”. We then analyse the British and Spanish 
experiences, and conclude with a discussion of how these experiences are consistent 
with the theoretical framework proposed in the first section. We will argue that the 
problems in the development of new and commonly accepted indicators can be 
explained by the existence of ambiguity and conflict in the area of Third Mission 
policies, and suggest some policy avenues that could be better suited to the future 
development of commonly accepted and comparable indicators. The authors of this 
article have participated directly in the processes and discussions we present and have 
derived some of the data presented below from their own experience.  
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Third Mission and its indicators as a policy 
implementation problem 
For at least a couple of decades governments in many European countries have been 
concerned by the way in which universities and public research establishments relate 
to society. Many different initiatives have been launched to increase the use outside 
academic environments of the capabilities residing within university organisations. 
There has been a broad agreement about the need to support these “Third Mission” 
activities, but much less clarity as to what the specific objectives and goals of these 
policies should be. Although it is broadly recognised that the term refers to the 
engagement of universities in non-academic activities, the same concept of “Third 
Mission” is subject to different interpretations:  
• As a stream of income. Burton Clark (1998) distinguishes three different streams 
of income accruing to universities. The First Stream is constituted by public core 
funds that universities receive to support their teaching responsibilities. The 
Second Stream refers to funds received from governmental research councils to 
support research. Finally, all other forms of funding constitute the “Third Stream”, 
including, for instance, income from philanthropic foundations, the European 
Union, student fees, the private sector, etc.  
• As the activities seeking the commercial exploitation of University resources and 
research results, through licensing, research and consultancy activities, and the 
generation of spin-off companies. It is often assumed that Universities control a 
broad array of capabilities that are not being adequately exploited for income 
generation. Through commercial exploitation these capabilities will be released 
and benefit, not only the universities themselves, but generate wealth for the 
regional and national economies.  
• As social outreach. Different analysts and policy-makers will define slightly 
different sets of social objectives to be achieved by universities. For instance, it is 
common in Latin American universities to have an office for university 
“extension” that supports the local communities, providing, for instance, 
engineering services for the design of water supply and irrigation systems, 
vaccination programmes, training programmes for local farmers, etc. In the UK, 
Ian Gibson, Chair of the House of Commons Select Committee on Science and 
Technology, has used the term “community stream” to refer to the need for 
universities to reach out to their local communities, by, for instance, providing pro 
bono services to community associations, and encouraging young people from 
deprived neighbourhoods to follow an academic career. Further, university 
researchers have often provided unpaid research and technical support in the 
aftermath of environmental disasters.1 All these activities are not commercially-
led: they do not aim to generate funds, but rather to provide services to the 
community.  
These are only examples of the different, and at times divergent, policy objectives that 
may be covered by the term “Third Mission”. Further, policy theory has been 
changing, with the literature on the “knowledge society” shifting the analytical focus 
from technology transfer to the broader concept of “knowledge exchange”. The 
product of this situation is a dynamic ongoing policy debate, which translates into 
disputes about policy objectives and goals. These debates, however, are seldom made 
explicit at the policy definition stage. Instead policy objectives are presented in 
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general and broad terms: increasing the contribution of universities to the economy 
and society is a general objective repeated across countries. That this general 
objective may be interpreted in different, or even, divergent way is left for the 
practical development and application of policy interventions: in other words, it is 
defined at what is commonly known as the policy implementation stage.  
The core argument of this paper is that the development of “Third Mission” 
indicators, far from being a purely academic pursuit, has become a key component in 
the implementation of Third Mission policies. To help us understand the problems 
that indicator development in this area is facing, we will draw here on the literature on 
policy implementation. The policy scholar R.E. Matland (1995) has developed a 
framework for the analysis of policy implementation to explain how different 
approaches to implementation will emerge in different contexts. He distinguishes 
policy contexts according to varying levels of ambiguity in the definition of policy 
objectives, and of conflict among policy stakeholders.2  
For instance, when there is low ambiguity and low conflict across agencies and actors, 
“administrative implementation” occurs. This is equivalent to the “top-down” 
implementation model (Sabatier, 1986): the policy maker will define clear policy 
objectives and devise tools to carry them out, among which we could include the 
establishment of a set of indicators to monitor policy results. “Top-downers” assume 
that politicians in charge of departments will have the power and the time to define 
clear political objectives to be then implemented by the departmental bureaucracies. 
This is, however, seldom the case. The detailed knowledge needed to define and 
implement policies is often in the hands of front-line bureaucrats, who deal daily with 
social and economic problems in need of solution. In these contexts policy goals are 
usually defined in vague, ambiguous terms. Yet, if there is no conflict regarding the 
specific definition of objectives, implementation can be left in the hands of the 
managers and experts in charge of day-to-day operations. This has traditionally been 
defined as a “bottom-up” implementation model. Those in charge of implementation 
at “the street level” will define their policy objectives and needs (including the data 
they require to carry out their tasks) and the resources they need to get them delivered. 
These models need to assume that a consensus exists about the policy objectives 
between bureaucrats and political authorities: bottom-up approaches work when there 
is no societal conflict about policy or where a consensus has been achieved. In this 
case, Matland argues, policy outcomes will depend on which actors are most active 
and involved in policy delivery. 
Unfortunately, the world of “Third Mission” policies does not respond to any of these 
models. The diversity of potential objectives has resulted in ambiguously defined 
policies. Without detailed knowledge of the processes of knowledge generation and 
diffusion, politicians tend to define the formal objective of Third Mission initiatives in 
broad, ambiguous terms that are interpreted in different ways by different 
stakeholders. There is a degree of conflict as regards objectives. Treasury departments 
will focus on revenue flows and implementation costs and will tend to favour policies 
that, on balance, can increase the income stream available to public universities. 
Community groups and some politicians are likely to support “social outreach” 
policies; while Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs) and other departments in charge 
of implementing Third Mission policies will often have a more nuanced view of their 
objectives and will be aware of the many different avenues through which the 
(ambiguously defined) Third Mission objectives can be achieved. Finally, and to 
make matters still more difficult, many academics are suspicious of the potential 
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impact of Third Mission policies and strive to maintain the primacy of academic 
objectives within university work. Ambiguity in the definition of policy objectives is 
accompanied by a degree of conflict among stakeholders about how policies should 
be implemented. 
Matland argues that when ambiguous policy objectives combine with conflicts among 
policy stakeholders we will encounter a situation that he defines as “symbolic 
implementation”: implementation will revolve around the deployment of highly 
visible social symbols. Ambiguity in the definition of objectives can play an 
important role as a tactic to avoid conflict when defining policy, but the conflict re-
emerges when the policy is implemented. Different groups of stakeholders interpret 
the policy in ways that suit their values. This allows them to avoid gridlock, but in the 
absence of clear objectives they need to back their actions by pursuing goals 
revolving around highly visible symbols. As a consequence, much policy effort and 
debate revolves around symbols, which, further, allow groups of stakeholders to 
institutionalise their own objectives and values (Berg, 2004). Finally, Matland argues 
that in symbolic implementation contexts, the outcome of the policy process will 
depend on the strength of local coalitions. In other words, the way policies are 
implemented will vary from one locale to another. 
Our hypothesis in this paper is that the development of Third Mission indicators can 
be seen as an example of “symbolic implementation”. Stakeholders responsible for 
policy implementation lack clear policy objectives and try to focus their activities by 
referring to, hopefully unambiguous, quantitative goals: thus policy implementation 
can be reduced to the pursuit of targets increasingly defined by limited sets of 
quantitative indicators. The debates on indicators are increasingly substituting for 
discussion on policy objectives. Instead, the indicators are the symbols around which 
policy implementation revolves. Such “symbolic implementation” can be 
complemented by the search for instances of “success” (however defined), which are 
then given as “glossy” a presentation as possible to politicians and the broader policy 
community. Successful cases form the basis of policy reports and presentations, and 
are often offered to and picked by the press as part of an ongoing policy debate. Case 
studies of successful examples play also an important symbolic role in policy 
arguments, although, in practice, when facing government departments holding the 
purse strings, policy managers often find that quantitative data pointing out the impact 
of a programme are a more convincing tool in the policy debate than a list of 
examples, no matter how glossy and professional their presentation is.  
This paper will show how the development of indicators to show policy impact has 
become the main component of the “symbolic implementation” of Third Stream 
policies. We will use the cases of Third Mission policy debates and indicator 
development in the UK and Spain and will show how these developments are 
consistent with the characteristics that Matland attributes to symbolic implementation 
environments.  
The UK Experience 
The UK has had a long experience in the design and implementation of projects 
addressing different aspects of “Third Mission” activities. Since 2001, the Higher 
Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) has been carrying out an annual 
survey, initially known as the “Higher Education-Business Interaction” (HEBI) 
survey and later renamed “Higher Education – Business and Community Interaction” 
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(HE-BCI). The survey collects data on a broad range of third mission activities 
reflecting the contributions of universities to economy and society. The survey is 
organised into several categories including collaborative research, intellectual 
property, consultancy activities, spin-off firms, training, personnel links and 
regeneration.  
In parallel, the UK University Companies Association (UNICO), and the Association 
for University Research & Industry Links (AURIL) supported by the UK Economic 
and Social Research Council (ESRC) commissioned Nottingham University Business 
School (NUBS), to carry a survey to gather data on, mainly, the technology 
commercialisation activities of UK universities. The so-called UNICO-NUBS survey 
focused on commercial activities including the number of spin-offs created, the 
barriers to spin-off formation and the income generated from commercialisation 
activities and was carried out annually between 2001 and 2003 covering a large 
sample of over 100 UK universities. The structure of this survey built upon the survey 
instrument designed in the US by the Association of University Technology Managers 
(AUTM).  
The whirlwind of “Third Mission” activity that characterised the first years of this 
Century in the UK can be attributed to two, interrelated policy events. First, a White 
Paper on science and innovation published in 2000 by the Department of Trade and 
Industry saw the British universities as “dynamos of growth” and “major agents of 
economic growth” (Department of Trade and Industry 2000, 27). To implement this 
vision, British policies regarding Third Mission activities were reconsidered. Since 
1999, HEFCE and DTI had allocated Third Stream resources to universities through 
discrete calls for tenders under a number of different schemes set up to support mainly 
knowledge transfer activities. These included the Higher Education Innovation Fund 
(HEIF), the Higher Education Reach-out to Business and the Community (HEROBC) 
initiative, and the University Challenge and Science Enterprise Challenge schemes. 
Universities trying to access these funds had to bid presenting specific project 
proposals. The project-based nature of the funding created long-term instability and 
therefore prevented the development of long-term Third Mission strategies. 
Consequently, the funding agencies and departments started considering the 
establishment of a stable stream of funding (the “Third Stream”) to support Third 
Mission activities in all UK universities. The objective of this permanent stream of 
funding would be the reduction of universities’ dependence on project bids (and their 
associated uncertainty and inefficiencies), and the provision of core funding to 
promote knowledge transfer. The problem became then the establishment of criteria to 
distribute these funds across British universities. The UK Treasury sought the 
establishment of a formula-based criterion that would take into consideration the past 
performance of universities in a selected set of activities that the funding stream was 
trying to encourage. The formula would have to be based on a common set of 
indicators. Establishing the types of indicators, defining them, and setting up and 
agreeing a formula became a very difficult problem that exercised, and will continue 
to exercise, the minds of academics, public servants and university administrators. 
Administrators of University TTOs were afraid that a simple formula, using relatively 
easy-to-gather indicators of university patenting, licensing, spin-off creation, and 
income generated by commercial activities would not reflect the variety of activities 
in which they were involved and would result in an disproportionately lopsided 
distribution of resources. As a result of this concern, in late 2001 the Russell Group of 
Universities, an informal grouping of UK leading research universities, invited 
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tenders for a study to develop a system of indicators for Third Stream activities. The 
resulting study (Molas-Gallart, Salter, Patel et al. 2002) stressed the need for a 
comprehensive definition of Third Mission activities, which would necessarily result 
in a more complex system of indicators that was initially envisaged. It identified some 
65 potential indicators organised under 12 different classes of Third Mission activity 
and suggested a roadmap towards the implementation of a system of indicators and 
the eventual development of a funding formula. The report underlined however the 
complexity of this task.  
The different classes of Third Mission activity were based on a fundamental 
distinction between what universities have (capabilities) and what they do (activities). 
Universities have capabilities in two main areas: (a) knowledge and (b) physical 
facilities. Using the means at their disposal, universities carry out three main sets of 
activities; they: (1) teach, (2) research, and (3) communicate the results of their work. 
Both capabilities and activities can be used and developed in support of non-academic 
socio-economic goals. The figure below summarises the different sets of Third Stream 
actions structured according to this framework. The 65 potential indicators we 
identified were structured into these 12 different classes.  
 
Source: Molas-Gallart et al. (2002) 
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derived from a variety of sources. The formula has three components (Higher 
Education Funding Council for England 2005):  
• “Potential and capacity building”, reflecting basically the size of each 
university  
• .”External income”, collecting indicators based on resources generated from 
Third Mission activities, including income from IP exploitation , “regeneration 
and development” and from non-credit bearing courses 
• “Activities not best measured” including data on student placements, 
engagement with non-commercial organisations and staff dedicated to Third 
Mission activities. 
In total some 12 indicators are included in the formula, about half of them derived 
from the HE-BCI survey, and the rest from other Higher Education data sources. This 
is the first step in a process through which HEFCE wishes to revise and improve the 
formula through an intense and open process of consultation. The set of indicators that 
is being used in this first attempt is already very broad and covers activities other than 
the purely commercial. In part this approach has been made possible by the way in 
which HEFCE had previously broadened its own Third Mission data collection 
activities. The fourth survey, published in January 2005, added other forms of social 
exchange to the traditional business interaction indicators that focused earlier 
versions. Noticeably, the new survey referred to knowledge “exchange” rather than 
“transfer”, and the exercise was renamed the “Higher Education-Business and 
Community Interaction (HEBCI) survey.  
Yet, the relationship between indicator collection and funding strategies is far from 
being solved. As the formula was being prepared, experts continue to question the 
wisdom of such an attempt, pointing out the danger that formula-based funding may 
focus policy on only a subset of Third Mission activities (Hatakenaka, 2005). 
Recently, HEFCE has commissioned exploratory work to try to determine, through a 
variation of the HEBCI survey, the impact of existing project-based funding of Third 
Stream activities. To sum up, progress in the development of new funding tools has 
been slow, and accordingly, the approach to indicator development remains under 
constant revision.  
The Spanish Experience 
The first instance in which the issue of indicators for Third Mission activities emerged 
in Spain was in relation to the implementation of the National R&D Plan in 1988. 
This was the first time in which a national programme to support R&D across a broad 
variety of fields and disciplines was implemented in Spain (Muñoz 2001). From its 
inception the plan included initiatives to promote cooperation and knowledge transfer 
between universities and public research establishments on the one hand and industry 
on the other. The main tool the Plan envisaged was the creation of technology transfer 
offices in universities and public research establishments (the Offices for the Transfer 
of Research Results –OTRI). To gather information about the outcomes of this 
initiative became a policy need. In other words, the first attempt to gather Third 
Mission indicators were directly linked to the monitoring and evaluation of funding 
schemes. The Plan funded the newly created OTRIs who had to report annually on 
their activities including R&D contracts (number, type, value, type of client), patent 
applications, licensing contracts, R&D projects, and OTRI personnel. 
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This information was collected annually during the 1989-1995 period, while the 
OTRIs were all receiving core funding from the National Plan. The data provided a 
detailed perspective on the OTRIs activities and their evolution, and offered a good 
longitudinal perspective on the most important channel for Third Mission activities 
available to Spanish universities. However, this approach to data collection changed 
when the funding structure changed. 
In 1996 this form of core funding was substituted by a new project-based approach to 
funding. The OTRIs applying for the new forms of funding had to submit, as part of 
their application, data on their activities over the previous three years. The data 
requested were much more exhaustive, including detailed information on the 
personnel structure of the applying OTRI, funding sources, and a number of 
“management” indicators which included the number of projects managed, lists of 
“clients”, patents, licences and spin-offs “managed”, and “other indicators” selected 
by the applicant. None of the categories used were defined, and it was therefore left to 
the applicants to interpret the categories in the way that suited them best. The 
gathering of a small number of well defined indicators for reporting purposes across 
all OTRIs had been abandoned without any discussion, and the data gathered through 
the funding application process lacked the representativeness, robustness and 
reliability necessary for their use as an indicator. Nevertheless the data was still used 
in an aggregate form to provide “indicators” of Spanish Third Mission activity in the 
annual National Plan reports. 
Along with Third Stream funding available from the National Plan, many Spanish 
regional governments deployed their own initiatives in support of Third Mission 
activities as part of their own regional R&D plans. This has led regional governments 
to request information on these activities from Universities and public research 
establishments, often referring to the economic resources obtained from patent 
licensing, and research contracts and research agreements with firms and other 
organisations. 
Importantly, the Spanish universities launched two main data gathering activities of 
their own. The “Conference of Spanish University Rectors” (CRUE) has published a 
biannual report since 1998 offering data on university sources of income including 
research grants. Unfortunately, the survey has been implemented in a way that does 
not fit with the conceptual conventions that have been used for decades in the analysis 
of science and technology policy. Respondents consider that all public grants, 
regardless of their objective and character, support “basic research”, and all the 
research stemming from research contracts to be “applied”, thus confusing the source 
of funds with the objective of the activity.  
In 1997, CRUE set up a network of all university OTRIs to support the “convergence 
and complementarity” between university research activities and the needs of their 
socio-economic environment. In 2000 the OTRI Network set up an “R&D Indicators 
Working Group” to develop information and indicators that could help them in the 
management of their work, be used to generate an annual report of their activities, and 
provide a solution to the proliferation of surveys and reports on University R&D and 
knowledge transfer activities that were being requested by national, regional, and 
European bodies. As the departments in charge of responding to official 
questionnaires and surveys in many universities, the OTRIs found themselves under 
an increasing administrative burden to respond to the several questionnaires in 
circulation. The objectives of developing a common survey were twofold. First, to 
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develop an efficient approach to data gathering and management that could supply the 
data needs of public agencies and provide comparable data while reducing the 
substantial effort that was being invested in answering the proliferating requests for 
data. Second, it aimed to provide a reliable tool for benchmarking and self-assessment 
of the OTRI Network members. 
The questionnaire was developed to be answered by OTRIs and assumed that they 
engaged in the management of a set of basic instruments. It distinguished between 
R&D contracts, government grants in support of collaborative R&D, assessment and 
protection of research results, licencing, and the creation of spin-offs based on 
research results or University capabilities. Yet, not all OTRIs engage in each and 
every one of these activities; besides it is common for them to change focus, 
abandoning at times a whole line of activity to enter or strengthen another. Therefore, 
it was difficult to agree a questionnaire format that would be equally relevant for a 
broad variety of institutional set-ups. In practice, however there is an even more 
complex difficulty: the experience with existing and previous data collection 
initiatives, pilots and co-ordinating discussions has shown that the same “indicators” 
are interpreted by different stakeholders in different ways. For instance, when 
referring to “contracts”, some approaches measure the contracted amounts, others the 
annual invoicing, other the income accrued, and yet others the number of contracts. 
Similarly, using “patents” as an indicator can be done in many different ways: some 
questionnaires ask for the number of patent applications (national, European or USA), 
the number of patents renewed, the number of licences obtained in a single year or the 
total number of patents under licence, the income received from licences, and so on. 
Not surprisingly then, existing survey instruments are long and cumbersome to 
answer. The annual survey that is now being distributed to the Spanish OTRIs has 
some 140 items, of which 127 require the supply of quantitative data, which has to be 
extracted from the OTRIs own databases and management systems.  
Alongside these initiatives, data continues to be gathered in the context of funding 
allocation processes, to assess institutes and research groups, and to provide 
benchmarking tools to managers. It is increasingly common that university, 
departments and research centres receive at least part of its funding on the basis of 
past activity or performance as reflected by sets of indicators. Yet the indicators being 
used vary across universities, public research establishments, and regions.  
Discussion 
Comprehensive Third Mission data is complex and expensive to collect. Both the UK 
and the Spanish case share an important aspect of the policy context in which the 
initiatives to develop indicators have taken place: data collection schemes have been 
related to the implementation of policy initiatives to support Third Mission activities. 
In the UK many of the initiatives that have taken place in recent years have been 
related to the attempt to set up a stable funding system that would not be based on 
project proposals, but would reward performance. In Spain, data on Third Mission 
activities was collected, initially, as a reporting requirement and, later, as part of the 
application process required to obtain funding to support Third Mission projects. The 
proliferation of agencies with an involvement in university and research policy led to 
the proliferation of data collection initiatives.  
The connection between the development of indicators and the policies to support 
Third Mission activities has important implications. While the policy goals have 
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remained ambiguously, if at all, defined, policy implementation has revolved around 
the definition of indicators and their establishment as policy targets. Within this 
context, characterised by a high level of ambiguity, the indicators that will be used to 
guide policy implementation are not clearly delimited and are the subject of debate 
and constant re-definition. Should, for instance, indicators of social outreach activities 
be included among those being collected? What should the balance be between 
indicators that refer to these activities and those that focus on IP commercialisation? 
Implicitly, the indicators that are ultimately selected will reflect different policy 
priorities, and different groups will favour different indicators or different 
combinations thereof.  
The organisations directly involved in Third Mission activities are naturally 
participating in the discussion on the development of new indicators. TTOs, for 
instance, are usually responsible for the assembly of data requested by public agencies 
and, therefore, have a keen interest in setting up systems of indicators aligned with 
their administrative practices, and which, in their opinion, will adequately reflect the 
scope of their activities. Further, they are interested in developing indicators that may 
help them in the management of their organisations: initiatives to generate 
comparable indicators for benchmarking purposes respond to this interest. Yet, the 
objectives and data needs of technology transfer managers are not necessarily the 
same as those of ministry officials. For instance, the type of data that can help in the 
efficient management of a TTO, are likely to be different from the limited number of 
indicators that could be used in a funding formula.  
Further, academic researchers may have different views on the desirability of Third 
Mission approaches, and may resist the additional reporting burden associated to 
indicator collection and centralised management of extra-academic activities. When 
academics have involved themselves in activities to develop and collect Third 
Mission data they have been guided by their research needs and have proved less 
sensitive to the organisational and administrative context within which data is 
generated and collected.3  
In short, different groups have different objectives, different data requirements, and 
different attitudes toward indicator definition, data collection and the final use of such 
data. The debate on indicators reflects the existence of a conflict among the 
stakeholders in the development of Third Mission policies.  
Through its focus on indicators, policy implementation has become symbolic, focused 
on indicators while the definition of clear policy goals and the establishment of 
explicit policy priorities is left unaddressed. Indicator development is part of the 
policy implementation process and, as Matland argues, the outcome of this process of 
symbolic implementation will depend on the strength of local coalitions. This 
characteristic of “symbolic implementation” is confirmed by our analysis. There is a 
fragmentation of initiatives following different approaches to indicator definition and 
collection, and these differences can be linked to different local institutional 
structures. In Spain the OTRIs concentrate many of the Third Mission activities of 
Spanish universities, and particularly those related to the relations between University 
and Industry. Until today, the OTRIs are practically the only organisations in Spanish 
universities that take responsibility for commercial exploitation tasks and, naturally, 
they remain the main locus of activity regarding data collection. The data they collect 
about their own activities provides an adequate, but increasingly less complete,4 
approximation to Third Mission activities traditionally carried out at the University 
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level (R&D contracts, patenting, licencing, spin-offs). Furthermore, in Spain there are 
multiple and evolving funding sources (some from central government, others from 
regional governments). The policy context is diverse and varies from region to region. 
There has been a multiplicity of initiatives, leading to different indicators being 
developed and applied in different regions and even in different universities within the 
same region. In England, the central role of HEFCE as the funding organisation 
leading a long-drawn-out process towards the systematic use of indicators in funding 
formulas explains a process of convergence in data definition and gathering. A 
formula has now been developed in collaboration with the universities, but the shape 
of this formula and its component indicators are far from having been settled. The 12 
indicators from different sources that are now being used are likely to be revised, and 
the data gathered through instruments like the HE-BCI survey will adapt itself to the 
evolving policy needs. Universities are playing an important role in these 
developments, together with the funding agency (HEFCE) and ministries 
(Treasury,…) and organisations. The final outcomes will again depend on the strength 
of the different groups interacting in this policy arena at the English level (Scotland 
and Wales develop their own funding systems). 
Different institutional arrangements across countries and regions lead to the dominant 
local coalitions of stakeholders to be also different. There may have different data 
collection needs, their management requirements will not be the same, and the use of 
indicators for policy implementation will also be at variance.5 In this context it is not 
surprising then that the attempts to develop a European-wide single system of 
indicators have made scant progress.6 It is, at best, very difficult to solve these 
differences through co-ordinating mechanisms. The implementation context in which 
indicator development takes place shapes the nature of indicator development, and we 
are to expect further fragmented initiatives. From the detached perspective of the 
academic analyst, the datasets that will emerge from this process will be adequate for 
static analysis of specific countries or regions, but unable to provide the basis for 
longitudinal and comparative study. We can conclude that, in the context of 
“symbolic implementation,” the data needs of analysts are not in the driving seat. The 
batteries of indicators on which future analyses will be built, and policy decisions 
taken, will not be provided spontaneously and freely, but will be the outcome of 
policy-making processes. In this situation, the quantitative analyst studying the 
relationships between university and society will need to rebuild and generate data 
sets constantly or end like the proverbial drunk: looking for his keys under the 
lamppost, where the light exists, rather than the place where they are likely to have 
fallen.  
This is a rather bleak view of the future. While indicator development continues 
linked to policy development and implementation, there is little room for 
improvement. To move away from this environment is extremely difficult. Data 
collection must be supported by adequate administrative processes and TTO managers 
will play a key role as data gatekeepers. The type of indicators that are becoming 
available are shaped more by existing managerial processes and group interests (both 
of which are highly variable within and across countries) than by the plans or desires 
of policy analysts.7  
The independent analyst will therefore be interested in the following question: is it 
possible to break the link between indicator definition and policy implementation? 
We are not optimistic. A possible avenue to “disconnect” them, while maintaining the 
involvement of the institutions and groups in charge of running Third Mission 
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activities, is to move data generation initiatives to a supra-national level. There are 
some examples already of supra-national initiatives to develop comparable indicators 
in areas related to Third Mission activities. In the last years both the OECD and the 
European Commission have been involved in studies aimed at benchmarking 
industry-science interactions.8. These initiatives aim to undertake international 
comparisons by using aggregate country level data on a limited number of indicators 
of industry-science interactions. They have had, however, the traits of a co-ordinating 
activity and suffered from the same difficulties we have explored in this paper. To be 
successful moving data generation to a supra-national level would require, instead, the 
assignment to an organisation like the OECD of the responsibility for data 
development and management, in a similar way to what is already being done with 
other Science and Technology Indicators, including R&D. Yet our analysis does not 
suggest that this will be easy to achieve: which policy groups at the national level 
would be interested in pursuing such a strategy? Even if a consensus was reached on 
the institutional leadership to launch a process of indicator definition and collection, 
technical problems would require a long-term effort. The way in which R&D and 
innovation indicators have been identified and collected by the OECD provides a 
good example of the difficulties that will be encountered. It took a long time to define, 
agree and implement the R&D indicators that are currently used worldwide. The 
Frascati Manual was revised and several annexes issued. It then took several years to 
broaden these indicators to cover other, increasingly relevant, innovative activities 
and to produce the Oslo Manual in 1995. This was then revised in 2005 and we are 
still far from obtaining reliable and comparable innovation indicators.  
In the meantime international comparisons and benchmarking data must be consumed 
with caution. An awareness of the institutional context in which data is defined and 
generated is a prerequisite to quantitative comparative analysis. By the same token, 
academic analysts must be realistic about the demands they may place on stakeholder 
communities when attempting to define new indicators. The scope for academic 
analysis of Third Mission data is dependent on the way in which data generation has 
become an element of the policy process and the focus of a symbolic approach to 
policy implementation. 
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1 Two Spanish examples are the oil spill caused by the sinking of the tanker Prestige in North East 
Spain, or the massive release of toxic waste from a zinc mine on to the Guadalquivir River and the 
Doñana National Park. 
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2 These are, at times, interrelated: often public policies will be worded in ambiguous terms to avoid 
conflict.  
3 For instance, the ProTon network has received proposals to collect indicators, which TTO managers 
within the network deemed virtually impossible to collect. 
4 The data provide a very poor estimate of activities (like social outreach activities) that are carried out 
independently by university researchers and groups and other types of university units.  
5 It must also be noted that a similar indicator will have different meanings in different contexts. While 
in Spain most formal Third Mission activities are channelled through the OTRIs, in the UK there is a 
wider diversity of organisations involved. Traditional TTOs are accompanied by Industry Liaison 
Offices, university departments in charge of IP management, etc. Therefore, in the UK an estimate of 
University-Industry relations cannot be carried out through a survey of TTOs, but must done at 
university level.  
6 An example of the difficulties encountered can be found in the work of the ProTon Europe network. 
This is an initiative funded by the European Commission bringing together 54 TTOs from different 
European countries. One of its working groups focused on the development of indicators that could 
provide the base for benchmarking across institutions. The network was set up in 2002, and carried out 
two pilot surveys in 2004 and 2006. The latter included 107 questions and gathered information from 
392 organisations from a total of 505 initially targeted. The questionnaire was very difficult to agree, 
and then many of the responses obtained were incomplete. At the root of the problems was the different 
organisational models and sets of activities carried out by TTOs in different countries (Conesa, Castro-
Martínez, Zárate, 2007).  
7 The only areas in which abundant data exists and cross-country comparisons are possible are those 
where due process requires the filing of public data, like patenting and patent-related income flows. 
These are however only one small part of the very broad field of Third Mission activities. 
8 The OECD devoted the third phase of the “National Innovation Systems Project” to the relations 
between science and industry. Within this framework, the OECD and the German Federal Ministry of 
Education and Research jointly organised an international conference, "Benchmarking Industry and 
Science Relationships", in Berlin, on 16-17 October 2000. Further, in 2001 OECD organised a high-
level workshop on the role and significance of intellectual property rights emanating from public sector 
research organisations. One of its objectives was to examine the extent to which various OECD 
countries are gathering data on aspects like the number of TTOs and Technology Liaison Offices 
(TLOs) per research university, the funds committed to Intellectual Property management, number of 
patents and licensing revenues, number and size of research contracts, etc. The goal was to suggest a 
standardised methodology and some core questions to be included in future questionnaires so that this 
type of data could be internationally comparable. The European Commission has launched several 
studies and workshops, followed by the publication of the resulting reports (Polt, Rammer, Gassler et 
al. 2001). 
